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Grand Principles of Narratology 
Henrik Schärfe 
Department of Communication, 
 Aalborg University, Denmark 
scharfe@hum.aau.dk 
Abstract: Through an analysis of a number of narratologies three Grand 
Principles are rendered as the epitome of much effort in narratology. The Principles 
are: Succession, Transformation and Mediation. The Grand Principles of Narratology 
correspond to three textual levels with their own characteristics in relation to different 
narrative concerns. Succession corresponds to a Narrative Syntax, addressing 
narrative coherence. Transformation corresponds to a level of Narrative Semantics, 
addressing the significance of correlating properties of textual elements, distributed 
throughout the narrative. Finally, Mediation corresponds to a level of Narrative 
Pragmatics, addressing questions of intentionality and relevance. These observations 
are collected in the ‘Narrative Matrix’, a model that may function as a guideline for 
narrative analysis, and as a means to discuss the expressive power of different 
narratologies. The description is subject to ontological considerations. 
 Keywords: narrative theory, succession, transformation, mediation, semiotics, 
syntactics, semantics, pragmatics. 
1. Introduction 
One of the long-term goals of narratology is to account for the 
mechanisms of all narratives and only of narratives. In this paper, I 
suggest a framework for narratologies based on a combination of three 
fundamental principles and three semiotic dimensions. The three 
fundamental principles of narrative and of narratology are considered 
as the elementary forces of narrative discourse, of storytelling, of story 
logic, and of story comprehension. The essential methodological move 
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in this paper is not only to identify these three constitutive elements, 
but in addition to apply them to the description of narrativity itself. 
2. Defining Narrativity 
I submit that narrativity can be defined as what takes place in 
texts where a complex relation consisting of three parts governs the 
relation between the text and that for which the text stands, between 
expression and content; and I submit that this insight is the epitome of 
much effort in narratology.  
Firstly, in narration, incidents and objects are not simply stated 
(that would amount to nothing more than description) they are 
arranged in sequences. This is the principle of succession, which is 
rooted in our experience of time and change. 
Secondly, in narration, sequences are more than episodical 
accounts (that again would amount to nothing more than description). 
Sequences are arranged in patterns signifying that some state of mind 
or some state of affairs undergoes some sort of change. This is the 
principle of transformation, and it is rooted in our perception of 
unities. Comprehension of unities enables us – among other things – 
to define beginnings and endings. The notions of time and succession 
in themselves do not. 
Thirdly, narration conveys something other than the content to 
which the expressions refer. This is the principle of mediation, rooted 
in our desire and ability to communicate about more than our 
immediate surroundings. Mediation differs from the description of 
unity and time in that this principle allows us to let the configuration 
of the unity refer to something outside the world of the text. Words 
like ‘premise’ and ‘rationale’ points to this principle. 
None of the three principles can stand alone as valid explanations 
for the extremely complicated mechanisms of narrative 
communication, and none of them can be omitted. Taken together, 
however, they explain how we utilize narratives to isolate, designate, 
and mediate. That is: they account for the essential parts of how we 
make sense of the world through narratives. Seen as a whole, the 
principles of succession, transformation and mediation allows us 
describe all and only narratives, and it provides a backbone for 
describing and evaluating narratologies. By removing any of these, the 
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construction falls apart, and we are left with something other than a 
narrative.  
On Succession  
According to Kant, all things are in time, and in the substratum of 
time only coexistence or succession can occur (Kant 1934: 212). 
Coexistence (conjunction) does not constitute a narrative since 
nothing happens. In coexistence, things simply are, and there is no 
temporal order. For the sake of the argument, imagine two 
propositions: 
 
A) Peter fired his gun.   
B) Paul dropped dead to the floor. 
In coexistence ‘A and B’ equals ‘B and A’. That is to say that the 
interpretation of A has no bearings on the interpretation of B and vice 
versa. For all we know, the two incidents could occur at different 
continents (in a Californian sunset and in a Scandinavian daybreak). 
All we can say is that two things happen at the same time. But if the 
incidents are placed successively, we get: 
 
C) Peter fired his gun and Paul dropped dead to the floor, or 
D) Paul dropped dead to the floor and Peter fired his gun. 
It is possible to maintain that the two incidents in C) as well as in 
D) are separate occurrences, but it is much more difficult, especially 
in C). Given a frame containing the propositions that someone fires a 
gun and that someone dies, we are likely to infer that the first person 
shot the second. The reason is that we apply inferences with respect to 
temporality and causality to the text. In the words of Tomashevsky: 
“We must emphasize that a story requires not only indications of time, 
but also indication of cause. “ (Tomashevsky 1965: 66) 
We are beings of time, and we are aware of it. This was evident to 
Kant, and to many others before him, including Leibniz who argued 
that our reasoning is based on two principles: that of contradiction and 
that of sufficient reason (Leibniz 1999: §31-32). Both of these are 
based on temporality and causality. 
To illustrate this and the following principles, please consider this 
well-known fable by Aesop: 
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The Hare and the Tortoise  
 A HARE one day ridiculed the short feet and slow pace of the Tortoise, 
who replied, laughing:  "Though you be swift as the wind, I will beat you 
in a race."  The Hare, believing her assertion to be simply impossible, 
assented to the proposal; and they agreed that the Fox should choose the 
course and fix the goal.  On the day appointed for the race the two started 
together.  The Tortoise never for a moment stopped, but went on with a 
slow but steady pace straight to the end of the course. The Hare, lying 
down by the wayside, fell fast asleep.  At last waking up, and moving as 
fast as he could, he saw the Tortoise had reached the goal, and was 
comfortably dozing after her fatigue.   
 Slow but steady wins the race.   (Aesop) 
We recognize the principle of succession by which the incidents 
are arranged. The sequence of the events is fairly clear, and can be 
rendered as follows: 
I-1. A hare ridicules a tortoise 
I-2. The tortoise replies laughing that she will beat the hare 
in a race 
I-3. The hare believes that the assertion of the tortoise is 
impossible 
I-4. The hare assents to the proposal of a race 
I-5. The hare and the tortoise agrees to let a fox arrange the 
race 
a. A fox arranges the race 
I-6. They start the race together 
I-7. The tortoise never stops racing 
I-8. The hare lays down at the roadside and  
a. falls asleep 
I-9. The hare wakes up and 
a. runs as fast as possible and 
b. sees that  
I-10. The tortoise has finished the race and is resting. 
Here, the incidents are presented in canonical (Ohtsuka and 
Brewer 1992) or unequivocal order (Herman 2002: 213), meaning that 
for any two incidents it is possible to ascertain an exact temporal 
relation. It should be mentioned, however, that the partial order is 
much more common that the unequivocal order. This is especially true 
if we consider time as durations rather than as instances. In theories of 
time and temporal logic the question of time as instants versus time as 
durations has been a great concern. Under this perspective, it is 
somewhat surprising that this matter by and large is left uncommented 
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by narratologists. In fact, Todorov, a firm believer in the principle of 
succession seems to exclude duration from the constitutive elements 
of narration (See the quotation in section 3). In the tradition following 
Genette, (Genette 1980) the term duration simply denotes a relation 
between discourse time and story time. In the present analysis, we 
shall simply say that events are related by temporality and causality. A 
graphic representation of the causal relations in the fable may look 
like this: 
Fig 1 Causal dependencies 
 
Without a doubt, the first grand principle in narratology is that of 
succession. I am not aware of any narratology that questions this. But 
true as this may be, the principle of succession in itself has some 
severe limitations. For instance: what exactly do we mean when we 
infer a causal relation? Certainly, it cannot mean anything like Mill’s 
‘invariable sequence’ according to which A is immediately followed 
Tortoise replies I-2
Hare ridicules tortoise I-1
Hare believes it impossible the 
tortoise should outrun him I-3
Hare interprets reply
as a challenge
The hare assents to race I-4
agrees to let a fox arrange I-5
A fox arranges the race I-5aThe tortoise never
stops racing I-7
The hare lays down
and falls asleep
I-8(+a)
The hare wakes
and runs fast I-9
The tortoise finishes first. I-10
They start the race
together I-6
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by B and anything similar to A is always immediately followed by 
something similar to B. This would entail that whenever (this) hare 
agrees to race a tortoise he will go to sleep during the race. And 
‘cause’ cannot be explained by counterfactual implication, which is to 
say that if A had not happened, B would not have happened; since this 
would entail that if the hare had not begun the race, he would not have 
fallen asleep. 
Please note in fig.1 that the chain of dependencies simply breaks 
once the race begins. The incidents 7-10 are not in any logical sense 
dependent on elements stated in incidents 1-6. Not even the portrayal 
of the hare as arrogant (in I-1) is enough to anticipate the strange case 
of a track-runner that goes to sleep in the middle of a race. Even for 
small and dense narratives like this, the notion of an unbroken chain 
of causes and effects does not hold because it does not take into 
account the phenomenon of peripeteia. Moreover, it is important to 
note that the dependencies are traceable only backwards. A forward 
counterpart is simply not feasible. On the contrary: from (almost?) any 
point in the narrative it is possible to envision alternative courses of 
action, and hence different conclusions. Sometimes, this is exactly the 
point. See for instance Manfred Jahn’s work on ‘garden-path 
narratives’ (Jahn 1999).  
The principle of succession, granted a primary status, lends itself 
to another principle of massive importance. This principle is that of 
transformation, and the reason for the intricate relationship between 
the two principles resides in the fact that succession is a prerequisite 
for describing change, and without change there can be no narration. 
On Transformation 
Aristotle’s notions of beginning, middle, and end illustrate this 
principle and its consequences vividly. In (Aristotle: book 7), Aristotle 
defines a beginning as: 
… that which does not itself follow something by causal necessity, but 
after which something naturally is or comes to be. 
 Both parts of this definition points to a temporal order. But the 
notions of ‘beginning’ and ‘ending’ have wider bearings than just that 
of temporality. Prominent scholars such as Ricoeur and Bruner have 
enriched our understanding of this matter. Ricoeur, on his part 
investigated in great detail the relation between time and narrative, 
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rooting his thinking in the works of Aristotle, Augustine and 
Heidegger (Ricoeur 1984). In Ricoeur’s thinking the matter of time 
plays an important role not only because sequentiality is a prime 
factor in constructing narratives, but equally important, because our 
understanding of narratives is grounded in temporal experience, at the 
level of reading and at the level of existing. Bruner, on his part, also 
points to the principle of succession as the first property of narrative. 
And like Ricoeur, he underlines that sequentiality is established by 
means of a higher principle. On the nature of narrative, Bruner argues: 
“Perhaps its principal property is its inherent sequentiality: a narrative is 
composed of a unique sequence of events, mental states, happenings 
involving human beings as characters or actors. These are its constituents. 
But these constituents do not, as it were, have a life of their own. Their 
meaning is given by their place in the overall configuration of the sequence 
as a whole – its plot or fabula.” (Bruner 1990: 43) 
In the fable, the principle of transformation is recognized by the 
overall configuration of elements. In the text we find actions 
(characterized by verbs), situational dependencies (e.g. that the race is 
arranged by a notorious runner – a fox), and the patterns of reaction 
(e.g. insult – response). And the elements are tightly connected into a 
unity, here underlined by the rhetorical trope of a chiasm. The event 
structure can than be displayed as follows: 
Tortoise resting
Tortoise ridiculed
Reaction to insult
Reaction to action
Assents to race
Asleep at roadside
A runner by nature
A runner by will
Starting together
 
Figur 2 Chiasmic display of events 
Even in a narrative as simple as this, we see how the principle of 
succession generates a coherent structure in which the elements are 
held together because one situation is transformed into another. 
Narratologies such as those of (Propp 1968), (Lévi-Strauss 1963), 
(Greimas 1966) and (Campbell 1993) comes to mind. Later, Todorov 
made his now famous claim that: 
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Thus it is incorrect to maintain that the elements are related only by 
succession; we can say that they are also related by transformation. Here 
finally, we have the two principles of narrative. 
(Todorov 1971) 
On Mediation 
But there is more. If we are to account for all and only narratives, 
these two principles are insufficient. Succession and transformation 
are essential components of narratives. But they are also fundamental 
principles of many other texts, including cooking recipes, travel plans, 
many scientific papers, and user manuals.  
In the definition of narrative, I state a third principle: that of 
mediation. Words like relevance, intention, rationale, and 
verisimilitude comes to mind here. In the context of narrative 
communication, none of these can be accounted for by the principles 
of succession and transformation. If we look at the text itself, and the 
inner workings of contingencies relating textual elements, the highest 
level we can rise to is the phenomenon of reportability as proposed by 
Labov (Labov 1972), which means that some incident is of such 
qualities that it is worth reporting. The first two principles cannot 
account for the communicative power of narratives, and neither can 
the third principle be understood independently.  
The principle of mediation means that the text refers to something 
other than the content of the text itself. This principle is frequently 
hinted at in the narratological literature as a principle in its own rights 
(McQuillan 2000: xi), as the epistemological condition under which 
narrative structures are employed (Greimas 1966), or as a pragmatic 
condition intrinsic to storytelling: “To tell a story is inescapably to 
take a moral stance, even if it is a moral stance against moral stances.” 
(Bruner 1990: 51) 
If we think of two texts, say the hare – tortoise fable and a recipe 
for apple-pie, and than ask a number of questions, the difference 
between the text types will be clear. 
 Consider questions such as: 1) What is the text about? 2) What 
does it tell us? 3) What do we learn from the text? For the apple-pie 
recipe, the answers to all of those questions are exactly the same: how 
to make apple-pie. But for the fable, the answers differ greatly. 
Suppose a group of listeners heard this fable for the first time, and we 
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than asked them questions 2) and 3); if their answers were simply 
accounts of the incidents, I would conclude that they had not 
understood the story at all. That is to say, that the point of the story 
had gone unnoticed. Moreover, I would not be surprised at all if the 
obtained answers were very much alike; typically something about 
good qualities in men, good conduct of live etc. But how is that? What 
is it that makes us ‘tolerate’ speaking animals, and in terms infer that 
the outcome of their doings has some bearing on our lives? The 
answer resides in the power of narrative mediation.  
The fable can give rise to another perspective on mediation. The 
fable is quite well known, and can be identified as type 275A in the 
Stith Thompson catalogue (Thompson 1973). And the central idea 
(motif) can be found in many variations in different cultures. The Stith 
Thompson catalogue reports versions from Latvia (275B), Spain 
(275C), Japan, India, West Africa, and different places in North 
America as well as from Europe. I would like to draw attention to a 
version from the Nez Perce tribe of northwestern America, called 
‘Turtle Races with Bull’ (Hines 1999: 171). In this variation, which is 
not included in the Stith Thompson catalogue, the winner gets as his 
price the right to eat the loser. The stakes are higher, but the two 
stories are quite similar. The conclusions, however, differ 
substantially. In the Nez Perce version, the turtles defeat the bull and 
than devour it, after which the author concludes that: ‘Thus it came to 
be said that turtle meat is very, very good for eating; it is really Bull’s 
meat’ (Hines 1999: 173).  
The question that now arises is this: How can it be that the same 
narrative structure can by used to promote a cosmogonic premise  – as 
in the case of the Nez Perce story and an anthropological premise – as 
in the case of the fable by Aesop? In the words of Ricoeur: 
…  a narrative conclusion can be neither deduced nor predicted. There is 
no story unless our attention is held in suspense by a thousand 
contingencies. Hence we must follow the story to conclusion. So rather 
than being predictable, a conclusion must be acceptable 
(Ricoeur 1981: 277) 
Thus, narrativity is regarded a characteristic of texts that 
incorporate all three principles as fundamentals. In the following I 
shall consider how these principles can be integrated in a framework 
that allows analysis of narrative communication. The means to do that 
is to consider the American tradition of semiotics as a second 
constitutive element of the model proposed in section 4. 
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3. Semiotics 
If we think of the minimal unit of narrative as a sign in the 
semiotic sense, is becomes possible to consider the aspect of 
succession, transformation, and mediation from a different 
perspective. In the tradition of American semiotics, after C.S. Peirce, 
the notion of a sign is defined as: “… something which stands to 
somebody for something in some respect or capacity.” (Peirce 1992: 
2.228).  
Following this definition, it becomes obvious that the level of 
analysis is not determined in advance, and that a theory of signs can 
be a suitable framework for different kinds of analysis. C.W. Morris 
defined three dimensions of semiotics that have earned him a 
reputation as one of the founders of semiotics (Nöth 1995: 49). Just 
like Peirce, Morris believed that semiosis consists of three parts: The 
relation between signs, the relation between sign and that for which 
the sign stands, and the relation between the sign and the interpreter. 
He named these areas: syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics, 
respectively (Morris 1938: 6-7). The terminology suggested by Morris 
has prevailed to the present day, except – of course – that his 
successors readily renamed syntactics as syntax. 
The tripartition into syntax, semantics, and pragmatics has been 
of great influence, especially in the area of linguistics, but in Morris’ 
theory – as in that of Peirce – the notion of a sign is not restricted to 
the linguistic sign. Thus, by following this tradition, the framework 
that emerges embraces the transposability of narratives from one 
media to another.  
4. The Narrative Matrix 
In narrative semiotics the quality of the individual sign depends 
on the scope and purpose of analysis. That is to say that anything we 
can justifiably describe as a minimal unit may be considered as a sign 
that can by studied under the perspectives of syntactics, semantics, 
and pragmatics. Thus, by narrative syntax I denote the study how 
minimal units of narrative can be combined into meaningful 
sequences. This area is intrinsically related to the principle of 
succession. By narrative semantics I denote the study of the 
significance that minimal units obtain from the things that they 
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(individually or collectively) represent. This area is intrinsically 
related to the principle of transformation. And by narrative 
pragmatics I denote the study of how collections of minimal units 
become the bearer of information distinct from the objects that the 
signs represent. This area is intrinsically related to the principle of 
mediation. But rather than simply restating the three grand principles 
of narrative into levels, or dimensions, I shall suggest that these two 
ways of describing narrativity complement each other. In other words: 
each principle and each dimension can be seen as having three 
aspects, defined by each other. This double tripartition can generate a 
narrative matrix that takes as in-put any minimal unit that we desire to 
investigate. 
 
 Succession Transformation Mediation 
Syntactics X   
Semantics  X  
Pragmatics   X 
The narrative Matrix 
In the following, we shall consider the two most prominent 
classes of minimal units: incidents and descriptive elements. 
Incidents 
INCIDENT Succession Transformation Mediation 
Syntactics Order Progression Relevance 
Semantics Performance Outcome Role 
Pragmatics Motivation Trait Reason 
 
At the syntactical level we consider the relation between one 
incident and another incident. It is well described in the literature that 
incidents are organized by means of temporality and causality to 
establish a certain order among them. The incidents may be reported 
in a number of different ways (see below), but nonetheless, the reader 
of the narrative must be able to place the events relative to each other. 
This is the principle of succession at work. But equally important, the 
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syntactic level is also what constitutes our sense of progression 
between states of affairs. That is to say that the ordering allows us to 
talk about one situation in which something is true, as before or after 
another situation in which something else is true. The reader must also 
be able to conclude that one situation has been transformed into 
another situation, and that the characters and other elements of the 
narrative maintain their identity throughout this transformation. 
Finally, the syntactic level can be used to fashion an anachrony 
between story and discourse by not reporting the incidents 
chronologically but in an alternative order, by means of analepsis, 
prolepsis, or starting in media res. This is often done to create tension 
or to enhance attention in the narrative, in which case it is a matter of 
succession. But it can also by used to demonstrate that, say; a 
character gradually learns some truth about something, in which case 
it is a matter of mediation, because the ordering pertains to something 
else than simply the chronology of the related incidents. In this way, 
the syntactical level has the capacity to mediate matters of relevance 
regarding the order of progression.  
At the semantic level, we may benefit from Chatman’s distinction 
between actions and happenings (Chatman 1980). When actions or 
happenings are linked together in sequences we may identify patterns 
or action schemata, which allows us to further describe dependencies 
between actions, and label some of them as ‘response’, ‘reaction’, 
‘answer’; and some of the happenings as ‘result’, ‘consequence’, etc. 
Under one heading we may talk about the performance of the 
characters. When such a sequence is viewed as a transformational 
scheme, it becomes possible to describe the semantics of the outcome 
of a sequence as, say, a success or a failure. Finally, the semantics of 
incidents can be used to mediate something that is not actually 
intrinsic to the incidents themselves or to their outcome, namely to 
present certain actions as e.g. heroic or pathetic, trustworthy or 
treacherous, and certain patients of happenings as victims or as 
fortunate ones. In this way, the semantics extends to the characters 
role in the overall narrative in the capacity of relating the performance 
to the outcome. The notion of an ‘actant’ comes to mind here. 
The pragmatic level takes us ‘behind the scene’, and allows us to 
describe successive events in terms of motivations for this or that 
action. E.g., where a sequence of actions may be semantically 
summarized as a ‘flirt’ or as a ‘deception’, a pragmatic summary may 
render this as ‘desire’. Similarly, a transformational sequence may 
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render the outcome (from the semantic level) in pragmatic terms as a 
trait of a character, that the semantics of the incident in itself could 
not vouch for. The pragmatic level also holds the capacity to mediate 
the premise of the narration or the reason for this particular narrative 
to take place. 
Descriptive elements 
Even narratologies that depend strictly on temporal relations 
between certain actions (such as (Propp 1968), (Dorfman 1969), and 
(Campbell 1993)) rely heavily on description as well as action. In fact, 
the notion of an initial state – as well as of other states – compels us to 
consider description as an intrinsic part of narrative, however briefly it 
may be presented in the actual discourse. That is to say that not only 
actions (incidents) are subject of temporality, but also conditions 
characterized by the absence of action (pertinent to the overall chain 
of events) are subject to temporality.  
Both of them receive their significance form their place in 
successively ordered chains of incidents, and both rely on temporality.  
A state of equilibrium means one thing at the beginning of a tale, but 
something quite differently at the middle of a story. Todorov remarks: 
Description and narrative both presuppose temporality, but the temporality 
differs in kind. The initial description was situated in time, to be sure, but 
in an ongoing, continuous time frame, whereas the changes that 
characterize narrative slice time up into discontinuous units: duration-time 
as opposed to event-time. Description alone is not enough to constitute a 
narrative; narrative for its part does not exclude description, however.  
 (Todorov 1990: 28) 
Descriptive elements are identifiable as occupying the semantic 
relations of manner, characteristic, and attribute. 
 
DESCRIPTIVE 
ELEMENT 
Succession Transformation Mediation 
Syntactics Order Progression Relevance 
Semantics Description Change Role 
Pragmatics Motivation Trait Reason 
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If we take as our minimal unit the notion of descriptive elements, 
it is fairly obvious that the three levels for the most parts can be 
described in the same terms as in the case of the incidents. This is not 
surprising, considering that descriptive elements alone cannot 
constitute narration, but that they add to the narrative. Thus, the 
syntactic and the pragmatic level remains essentially the same, but the 
construal of the semantic components must obviously be altered since 
performance and outcome are unsuitable to account for adjectives and 
similar constructions. These two aspects I shall name description and 
change, respectively.  
5. Conclusion 
By stating three fundamental principles of narratology, and by 
combining them with three semiotic dimensions, a model – the 
narrative matrix is generated. The names of the slots in the matrix may 
be subject of discussion, and depending on the scope and purpose of 
analysis, different terms may be applied. Nonetheless, many kinds of 
narrative analysis will employ terms that are subsumed by the 
categories event and descriptive element, in which case the suggested 
names of the slots will still make sense. In fact, the narrative matrix 
embraces a great number of minimal units, atomic as well as 
compound. Examples include: themes, events, emotional displays, 
diegetic shifts, shift in deixis, etc. 
Moreover, the model sustained by this double tripartition can be 
used to evaluate and compare different narratologies, since a given 
theoretical observation rarely (if at all) makes use of all nine slots in 
the narrative matrix.  
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